Are Reasons Causally Relevant for Action? Dharmakīrti and the Embodied Cognition Paradigm by Coseru, Christian
109
Buddhist Philosophy: A Comparative Approach, First Edition. Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel.
© 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
6
For Dharmakīrti – the influential seventh‐century Indian Buddhist philoso-
pher who, along with his predecessor Dignāga (480–540 ce), serves as a 
founding figure of the Buddhist logico‐epistemological school  –  there is a 
special relationship between reasons and causes: specifically, Dharmakīrti 
and some of his followers, like many contemporary philosophers of a more 
naturalist persuasion, put forward the view that intuitions about causal chains 
of events can serve as reasons for effective action. The leading question of this 
essay is whether Dharmakīrti’s account of reasoning could contribute to 
c urrent debates in epistemology and philosophy of action. I will not address, 
therefore, exegetical questions about whether what we are dealing with here is 
some kind of sui generis naturalism, serious metaphysics, or something 
c ompletely different.1 Instead, what I propose to do is ask a series of questions 
about the relation between reasons and causes at work in Dharmakīrti’s 
kāryānumāna argument (that is, the argument that an inference is sound only 
when one infers from the effect to the cause and not vice versa), and derive 
some conclusions about whether or not Dharmakīrti shares a common 
c oncern with current practitioners of naturalized epistemology.
Causality, Intentionality, and Mental Content
Dharmakīrti’s work can be seen as extending the metaphysical and phenome-
nological concerns of Abhidharma, with its focus on mapping out the structure 
of our cognitive architecture and the function of its various constitutive 
elements (perception, attention, intentionality, etc.). By advancing a concep-
tion of causation that includes consciousness and cognition as causal efficient 
categories, Abhidharma presents us with a metaphysics of experience: the 
irreducible elements of existence (dharmas) are not essences or substances, 
but activities, properties, and patterns of connectedness.2 The project of 
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identifying and mapping out these irreducible elements (e.g., sensation, 
v olition, attention, memory) shares many of the concerns of embodied and 
enactive cognitive science, even as it lacks the latter’s empirical foundation.
One way to frame Dharmakīrti’s project is as an attempt to situate these early 
Abhidharma explorations of the function of consciousness and cognition on a 
firm epistemological basis. Given a general concern with examining the sources 
of reliable cognition, Dharmakīrti’s epistemological orientation (much like that 
of his predecessor, Dignāga) is naturalistic. Indeed, he articulates his account 
of language and inferential reason (as circumscribed by his apoha theory) 
largely on a model of embodied cognition, not unlike that pioneered in the 
work of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991).3 As a systematic inquiry into the 
foundations of knowledge, Buddhist epistemology thus aligns closely with con-
temporary naturalized epistemology. For the purpose of this analysis, I take 
naturalism to be a commitment to considering the empirical evidence from the 
sciences of cognition in settling questions about the acquisition of beliefs.4 
More broadly, naturalism refers to the notion that reality is exhausted by 
nature, although the question whether “nature” should include the mental is 
itself a part of a long‐standing philosophical debate. Philosophers with weak 
commitments to naturalism typically operate with rather unrestricted notions 
of nature, whereas stronger adherents to naturalism define it more stringently. 
My position on naturalism, which I defend at length elsewhere,5 closely aligns 
with the so‐called 4E (embodied, enactive, embedded, and extended) approach 
to cognition: cognitive awareness is to be thought of not as an internal state of 
mind or brain locked into linear causal chains of sensory input and behavioral 
output. Rather, it is to be understood as a structure of comportment, 
an  i ntentional and self‐disclosing orientation and attunement to a world of 
actions, objects, and meaning.
Closely related to the question of how the intentionality or directness of 
mental states is at all possible is a more difficult question: How do mental states 
acquire their intentional content? That is, how do mental states come to be 
about something other than their own operations, and thus to serve as ground 
for effective action? No satisfactory answer to this question can circumvent 
debates about externalism versus internalism in epistemology. The question 
that I will pursue here, however, is more specific (and more apt to cut across 
this debate): Can such intentional content, in turn, play a causal role in explain-
ing how acting toward some end is successfully accomplished? Specifically, if 
the justification for pursuing a certain course of action and the ensuing dispo-
sition to act are not simply outcomes of post hoc rationalization but integral 
elements of the causal web of events, then different chains of justification do 
not simply explain but enact different outcomes.
On the surface, it may seem as though this way of framing the problem of the 
relation between reasons and causes is trivial. Of course, thinking about raising 
my hand can cause my hand to go up. But insofar as actions are grounded in 
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the physical biological processes that realize them, it is not at all clear how and 
where reasons fit in the causal web. What makes Dharmakīrti’s proposed solu-
tion to this conundrum interesting is not just his argument that reasons are 
causes (or, at least, are causally relevant for action), but his attempt to defend it 
on a strictly Abhidharmic (that is, reductionist) understanding of causation (on 
the model provided by the causal principle of dependent arising). If events 
arise due to a multitude of causes and conditions, then, the phenomenal primi-
tives that mental states reduce to must play a constitutive role in the arising of 
these events. Buddhist moral psychology attests to the possibility of overcom-
ing habitual modes of behavior. As such, it also provides reasons for valuing a 
certain course of action (viz., the Noble Eightfold Path), and expected out-
comes (e.g., the goods that all Buddhist adepts seek). If, as Dretske (1989, 2) 
claims, reasons help us “to explain why we should do some of the things we do,” 
then they are the causes for doing some of the things we do (even as they do not 
make explicit how our doings are behaviorally achieved).
One possible objection to this line of inquiry would be to say that the reduc-
tionist models of cognitive science differ in significant ways from those which 
are at work in the Abhidharma. The former are rooted in a variety of accounts 
of cognition in terms of functionalist, computational, and neurobiological 
models, to cite but a few, which may or may not be intertheoretically reducible. 
The latter offer at best a mereological account of whole–part relations, in 
which more complex entities (e.g., chairs) and cognitive events (e.g., pains) are 
explained in terms of either externally conditioning factors (material elements) 
or internally dispositional constituents (phenomenal primitives). Since the 
only types of entities that are admitted to exist are those that cannot be further 
physically decomposed or dissolved through conceptual analysis, ultimately 
we are left with kind and quality terms. As Vasubandhu writes in the 
Abhidharmakośa: “When the apprehension of an entity persists after that 
entity has been reduced through conceptual analysis, that entity exists 
u ltimately, e.g., form: while form may be reduced to atoms, and while we may 
exclude from it through cognitive analysis other qualia (such as taste, etc.), 
the apprehension of the proper nature of form persists” (Pradhan 1975, 334).
The Abhidharma tradition thus understands causality not in terms of relations 
between elements and compounds but in terms of a tripartite action–object–
agent or cognition–cognized–cognizer model (pramiti–prameya–pramātṛ). 
It is this model of cognition that informs the view of Buddhist epistemologists 
such as Dharmakīrti.
A more serious objection comes in the form of arguments that invoke the 
causal closure of the physical domain as providing justification for treating 
mental events as causally inert. Although responses to this line of argumenta-
tion can vary widely, the notion that, as Dretske puts it, “what we believe, 
intend, and desire has no bearing on what we do” (Dretske 1989, 3) is deeply 
problematic. One solution is found in token‐identity theories of the mental, 
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which argue for the causal efficacy of mental events insofar as they are token‐
identical to physical events, a view known as anomalous monism (cf. Davidson 
1970). The approach I favor follows closely Lowe’s (2008) view that causation 
in the mental domain functions on principles of intelligibility (that is, on 
principles which make it perfectly intelligible for intentions to have a causal 
role in initiating behavior) rather than principles of mechanism (that is, on 
principles which explain how causation works in the physical domain). Mental 
events, thus, should be understood as causing actions not physical effects, 
since actions are not the sort of things studied by the natural sciences. Those 
actions will have their behavioral signatures when enacted, but as actions they 
cannot be understood in purely behavioral terms.
We can easily answer the first objection either by showing that the reduc-
tionist model of cognition at work in the Abhidharma is open to revision, or by 
pointing to embodied and embedded models of cognition to show that not all 
cognitive science is eliminativist. The second objection, as already noted, is 
considerably more difficult, in part because it invokes the casual closure of the 
physical domain as evidence for the epiphenomenal character of mental states. 
My proposed solution comes in the form of a new kind of naturalism: call it 
phenomenological naturalism. As I have argued elsewhere (Coseru 2015), 
p henomenological naturalism provides a way to articulate the relation between 
phenomenology and the project of naturalization that neither eliminates the 
first‐person givenness of experience, nor collapses all of nature into what is 
experientially available. On this view, intentional mental states and their 
c ontents are structural features of our cognitive architecture. Insofar as our 
cognitions attain their objects, their features both map out the range of possi-
bilities that are available to us, and structure the causal process that guarantees 
the effectiveness of our actions. Cognitive events, which arise as a result of the 
tight causal coupling between perception, reflection, and action, then, are not 
causally inert. Rather, they are constituted as causally relevant factors in the 
determination of action.
Cognition and Pragmatic Efficacy
Let me start with a general characterization of the Buddhist epistemological 
enterprise (pramān ̣avāda) as a manifest form of epistemological optimism. 
Epistemological optimism is, generally speaking, the view that at least a sub-
set of our cognitive modalities are reliable, and that it is actually possible to 
provide an explanatory account of how such modalities provide effective 
guidance for our actions. If Dharmakīrti is an epistemological optimist, 
which I think he is, then he must be held to task: he must show, first, how 
perception (one of the only two sources of knowledge he deems reliable) 
gives access to real particulars, and, second, how linguistic and conceptual 
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practices can be pragmatically efficacious, that is, how they can lead to successful 
action given his generally nominalist stance.
For the purpose of this analysis, I will mainly focus on the second question, 
which requires that we briefly unpack some of the key aspects of Dharmakīrti’s 
theory of inference. As is well known, Dharmakīrti’s arguments in support of 
providing a metaphysical basis for inductive reasoning, especially as presented 
in the Svārthānumana chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika (Dharmakīrti 1957),6 
address a series of important and as yet unresolved issues regarding the foun-
dational role of perception for knowledge. Resolving any of these issues would 
arguably have broader implications for our understanding and assessment of 
the nature and scope of the Buddhist epistemological enterprise.
I have two proposals here. My first is that we seek to understand Dharmakīrti’s 
innovative contributions to reasoning in epistemological rather than meta-
physical terms: that is, in terms of how reasoning from evidence does and 
should proceed, rather than in terms of the justification of what kinds of things 
can be demonstrably said to exist. My second proposal is that we view 
Dharmakīrti’s causal account of knowledge in terms of a certain conception of 
cognition as dynamically constituted and, thus, as a mode of engagement with 
situations and things.
Let me start with a brief summary of Dharmakīrti’s innovative contribution 
to inductive reasoning. In response to Dignāga’s (allegedly failed) attempt to 
resolve the problem of induction by means of the triple inferential method 
(trairūpyahetu), Dharmakīrti formulates his well‐known principle that reason-
ing from the empirical data must be grounded on more than the simple obser-
vation and non‐observation of occurring associations and dissociations, 
following the established method of anvaya (association of the evidence with 
the property to be established through it) and vyatireka (dissociation of the 
evidence with the property to be established). Dharmakīrti expands this 
method also to include a discussion of the paks ̣adharmatā, the so‐called 
e vidence–subject relation, by means of which the trustworthiness of the f ormer 
is established.
Consider the following key passage from Hetubindu 2.13 (“Drop of Reason” 
in Steinkellner 1967), in which the evidence–subject relation is spelled out in 
terms of the feature‐placing power of reliable modes of apprehension:
As previously stated, certainty [about the evidence–subject relation] is 
how perception and inference establish a quality of the subject, which 
serves as a property to be proven, such as, for instance, the determina-
tion that smoke is present in a locus or that the quality of being a prod-
uct applies to sound. Thus, by means of perception there is the 
experience of a smoke possessing place whose distinctive character 
differs from everything else in its uniqueness. Given perceptual 
acquaintance with that place, there is, in a subsequent moment, 
0003042998.INDD   113 1/27/2017   10:26:39 AM
Christian Coseru114
the cognition of evidence; this subsequent cognition is a type of recol-
lection whose object is the difference [that enables the dissociation of 
smoke from non‐smoke] on the basis of perceptual testimony.
Thus, when Dharmakīrti postulates that for a sound argument to obtain, two 
natural relations (between the evidence and what is to be established thereby) 
must be present, he is making a case for an enactive account of cognition. The 
two relations, of identity (tādātmya) and causal generation (tadutpatti), are 
effectively ways to state the token‐identity of reasons and causes. Dharmakīrti’s 
answer to the question of how these two natural relations are to be ascertained 
is framed by his defense of core Buddhist metaphysical principles, in this case, 
chiefly that of momentariness. It is here that Dharmakīrti’s text raises three 
important issues concerning the nature of evidence and the role of perception 
in disclosing something essential about the order of the chain of events in the 
empirical domain. First, what is the nature of evidence or, more specifically, of 
the evidential property (hetu) for the thesis, or that which is to be established 
(sādhya)? Second, what would be the implication of asserting that the truth of 
the major premise can be known by perception? And finally, can a careful 
inspection of the effect, in the case of Dharmakīrti’s kāryānumāna argument, 
be conducive to ascertaining the unique causal totality that is its source?
The answer to the first question is clear: only the two natural relations of 
identity and causal generation can serve as evidential property for the thesis. 
I will turn to these in a moment. The second question does not invite a straight-
forward answer. As Richard Hayes and Brendan Gillon (2008, 362) have 
recently explained, to claim that one can know the truth of the major premise 
by perception amounts to saying that whatever conclusion one may arrive at 
through inferential reasoning can also be known by perception. On this 
account, then, inferential reasoning would become a redundant source of 
knowledge.
As I have argued at length elsewhere (Coseru 2012, 115), it needn’t be so, and 
this is where I think a naturalized account of reasons comes in handy: indeed, 
inferential reasons turn both toward ideal objects and toward the subjective 
modes of apprehension that ground our thought. When a proposition of the 
sort “sound is impermanent, because it results from effort” is judged true, it 
becomes true, logically speaking, once and for all such that its opposite is false. 
However, the problem is that “once and for all,” or “perpetually” (nityam), is a 
subjective locution that belongs to the subjective experience of temporality. 
Furthermore, for any given system of reasoning, when we try to establish the 
truth of a proposition we invariably find ourselves having to turn away from 
the actual structure of the argument and appeal to experience or to a coherent 
system of beliefs (at least on a coherentist theory of truth). Models of embod-
ied and embedded cognition developed in the last three decades7 (and their 
adaptations in the Buddhist context8) suggest that perception is not simply a 
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passive mode of apprehending objects and properties in the empirical 
domain  –  or what the Buddhist calls “unique particulars”  –  but an active 
p rocess of involvement with situations and things.9
This need for grounding reason in experiential access to some presumably 
irreducible given (or to the givenness of experience itself ) does not necessarily 
imply that Dharmakīrti is an epistemological foundationalist.10 Here I want to 
make a different sort of claim, one that may suggest a bold answer to the third 
question: namely, that careful scrutiny of the effect can provide a basis for 
ascertaining the unique causal totality that is its source, but only for reasoning 
that is context‐specific. I am prompted, thus, to ponder whether the inferential 
model at work in the Buddhist epistemological literature is best described as a 
system of pragmatic or context‐dependent reasoning. Unlike deductive sys-
tems of semantic reasoning, which are context‐free, pragmatic reasoning is 
largely inductive and encompasses the types of logic (nonmonotonic and para-
consistent) that represent reasoning from premises that are context‐specific. 
On this model of pragmatic reasoning, while a given sentence φ may be a 
p ragmatic consequence of a set of premises φ it need not be a pragmatic 
c onsequence of a larger set of premises φ ∪ Ψ.11
Indeed, following Dignāga’s inductive model of reasoning, we reason by 
first observing the occurrence of certain properties in an object or class of 
objects and the non‐occurrence of those same properties when the object is 
absent. We establish that in order for a linguistic utterance to acquire the 
status of logical proof, the reason (hetu) must be present in the thesis (that is, 
in the position that is stated), be also present in similar positions, and be 
absent from all dissimilar positions. This is Dignāga’s well‐known model of 
the triple inferential mark (trairūpya), which operates by deriving hypotheti-
cal statements from past observations of the inductive domain. Consider 
again the example of p roduced phenomena such as sound: sound is imper-
manent because it is a product, and whatever is produced exists by virtue of 
its supporting causal and conditioning factors and ceases to exist with the 
cessation of its support. Conversely, a permanent object cannot be produced. 
That is, arguably, how we arrive at a logical reason. Thus, a proposition of the 
type “Sound is impermanent, because it results from effort” is true so long as 
we do not encounter an example of permanent, hence unproduced, sounds. 
Were we to come across such a counter‐example, the proposition will be 
falsified.12
Now, Katsura has defined this type of logic as “hypothetical reasoning based 
on induction” (Katsura 2007, 76), claiming that while reasoning for oneself is 
essentially inductive, the presentation of arguments to others follows the 
deductive path. Indeed, to the extent that this system of reasoning, which is 
based on the observation and non‐observation of evidence, is open to revision 
so as to accommodate cases where there is a violation of the linguistic convention, 
we may describe it as a system of pragmatic reasoning.
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Dharmakīrti’s attempt to ground reasoning on a stronger principle than 
mere observation and non‐observation of the evidence led him to postulate 
that there must be some “essential connection” (svabhāvapratibandha) 
between the thesis and what is to be demonstrated. Although this essential 
connection is meant to address the problem of the uncertainty of hypothetical 
reasoning, it is not pragmatically neutral, since Dharmakīrti’s ultimate criterion 
for truth is the causal efficacy of cognitions (arthakriyā).
A Theoretical Model for Causal Inference
Let’s take a closer, if brief, look at Dharmakīrti’s descriptive analysis of the role 
of causation for inference, as found in his principal work, the Pramāṇavarttika 
II.11–38, and its autocommentary, the Svopajñavṛtti (hereinafter abbreviated 
as PVSV; Pandeya 1989). First, in order to establish the sort of evidence that 
can serve as a warrant for sound inference and, at the same time, to rule out 
those instances of erratic attribution of a connection between evidence and the 
property to be proven, Dharmakīrti avails himself of various examples of things 
that are ordinarily thought of in conjunction: the act of speaking and passion, 
rice and cooking, a living body and breathing, perceptual awareness and the 
senses, and, of course, the stock example of fire and smoke.
The question that Dharmakīrti considers concerns the sort of properties, 
whether observed or unobserved, in similar or dissimilar cases, that can be 
counted as evidence for asserting a given thesis. How are such properties 
ascertained? That is, how does one come to know the truth of the major 
p remise? Dharmakīrti makes use of the first two examples to argue against the 
principle that mere observation and non‐observation of occurring associations 
and dissociations is a sufficient ground for sound inferential reasoning. In the 
case of the act of speaking and passion, observation of their occurring associa-
tion is just a case of erratic evidence, for at most the act of speaking can serve 
as ground for inferring the presence of a speech organ and a capacity to com-
municate (PVSV 12.3), not of passion. Of course, here he is indirectly rejecting 
the notion that speech requires passion – seen as an affliction – for its cause: 
thus, buddhas, who are certainly observed to speak, cannot do so on account 
of something which they have overcome. In the case of rice and cooking, non‐
observation in dissimilar cases does not provide sufficient grounds for sound 
inference either: even though one may observe grains of rice cooking in a 
cauldron, one cannot thereby infer that all the grains of rice are cooked simply 
because they happen to be in the cauldron. Indeed, hypothetically speaking, 
some may be uncooked (PVSV 13.1).
How, then, can one escape the risk that there may be unobserved instances 
to the contrary, given that observation of a relation between things at a given 
place and time does not necessarily guarantee that the same relation will occur 
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in other places and at other times? For Dharmakīrti the solution to this conun-
drum is appeal to rules of reasoning that best reflect the nature of causally 
efficient entities: that is, to the so‐called natural relation (svabhāvapratibandha) 
between the properties of an inference. As he explains, one cannot infer from 
a cause to its effect, or from a causal totality (kāraṇasāmagrī) to an effect, 
because there is always the chance of impending factors preventing the arising 
of the given effect. Consider, for instance, cases when the rice in the cauldron 
is clumped. But Dharmakīrti does admit that one can infer from the effect to 
the cause, though only in a restricted case. As he writes in PVSV 12.4, “only an 
immediate effect enables the inference of a cause, because it is dependent on it.”13 
The Sanskrit here for “immediate” is nāntarīyakam, which can also be 
t ranslated as “inseparable” or “without interval,” conveying the sense of tight 
p roximity that is associated with causal–cognitive chains.
For Dharmakīrti, thus, an awareness of the causal totality can serve as a 
legitimate basis only for asserting that effects arise due to a variety of causes 
and conditions. Such awareness, however, may not be able to establish which 
specific effect arises due to which specific set of causes. Much like Dignāga 
before him, Dharmakīrti too is concerned with maximizing our predictive 
capacity to make sound inferences, the ultimate, and obvious, goal of which is 
achieving desired ends.14
Dharmakīrti’s view of the role of causality for reasoning, then, may be 
s ummarized as follows: one can only legitimately infer from the effect to the 
cause, and only in the case of an immediately arising effect, since even knowing 
the causal totality for a given effect does not guarantee that impending factors 
would not preempt its arising. Now, a naturalized account of the kāryānumāna 
argument would have to take into account at least two things:
1) Empirical evidence that the reason, or that which is to be proven, acquires 
its evidential status as a result of factors that are inherent to our cognitive 
architecture, specifically to information processing systems that translate 
perceptual content into action.
2) A theoretically robust account of how intentional content, as the subjective 
basis for reasoning, can in turn play a causal role in explaining how acting 
toward some desired end is successfully accomplished.
As noted above, given different strategies of naturalization some may prove 
more effective than others. The strategy I favor takes the view that reasons can 
be naturalized both by bridging the gap between phenomenology and natural 
science, and by extending the concept of what counts as natural to include also 
the mental.15 The general idea is that perceptual and mental processes have 
evolved to provide effective and meaningful interaction with the environment. 
Of course, these are, at best, working hypotheses and play at most a heuristic role. 
Nevertheless, they do provide an account of reasons that is both scientifically 
informed and phenomenologically constraining.
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Recall our second leading issue: to say that the truth of the major premise can 
be known by perception is to put forth a particular view of perception – one 
which views perceptual awareness as a form of embodied action. On this view, 
perceptual awareness does requires input stimuli for its activation but the 
resulting perceptual content depends on a set of preconscious or preattentive 
processes of selection and grouping operating on the input data. These pro-
cesses are generally thought to be representational: they re‐present schematic 
components of perceptual experience following sensory‐motor modalities. 
Perceptual awareness is thus inherently projective with the object of percep-
tion being the result of interactions between the input stimuli and dynamic 
information processes that are part of the architecture of sensory systems.16
To take just one example: evidence from neuroscience relating to cases of 
blindsight indicates that achieving a desired end, say navigating around objects 
in an environment without seeing them, can be achieved in the absence of any 
perceptual awareness of the objects, so long as the largely unconscious causal 
mechanisms that regulate sensorimotor intentionality remain functional. 
The philosophical upshot of this sort of phenomenon is that pragmatic reason-
ing of the sort that causes an individual to successfully reach an object even 
without being directly aware of it is possible by virtue of the fact that cognition 
is embodied and embedded within the environment of which it is a part.
On this account of embodied cognition, direct perceptual awareness, as con-
ceived by the Buddhist, is an effective source of knowledge precisely because it 
is a form of embodied action. For to perceive is to understand how we cope 
with the environment we inhabit. We cannot cope very well if we take the 
world to be a vast agglomeration of entities that lack any reference to subjects 
of experience. This brings us to our third and final issue: can a careful inspec-
tion of the effect be conducive to ascertaining the unique causal totality that 
is its source?
Dharmakīrti argues that an inference from the cause to the effect is unsound. 
Now, what about inference from the effect to the cause? Consider the typical 
example of a park ranger: in spotting a column of fire rising above a mountain, 
she can legitimately infer that there is a fire, but not whether the fire is fueled 
by redwoods or by eucalypts. On closer inspection, she may detect from the 
peculiar color and odor of the smoke that it is eucalypts that fuel the fire, but 
still not know whether the fire was started by lightning or by embers drifting 
from a campsite. Closer inspection still may reveal that an arsonist in fact 
started the fire.
But this example, which I adopted and adapted here from Hayes and Gillon 
(2008), overlooks an important fact: the park ranger’s experience. Unless this is 
her first day on the job, ideally she already has the sort of requisite knowledge 
and embodied skill demanded by the task at hand: ascertaining the unique 
causal totality of a given column of smoke. Her perception of smoke happens 
within a certain horizon of background intuitions about the height and 
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distance of the smoke column, the time of day, current weather conditions, the 
location of campsites, the flammability of various tree species, and a recent 
history of arsonist attacks. It is this horizon of background intuitions that, on a 
model of embodied cognition, accounts for the efficacy of the inferential 
process.
Conclusion
A central principle of the embodied and enactive cognition paradigm is that at 
least a subset of our cognitive processes are not entirely internal but rather are 
co‐constituted by external processes that extend into the environment. It is for 
this reason, I think, that Dharmakīrti’s kāryānumāna argument could be inter-
preted as a species of what Keijzer and Schouten (2007) describe as process 
externalism: the view that reasons, as active forms of deliberation and cogni-
tive engagement, depend on – and are continuous with – bodily processes that 
are embedded in the environment of which we are a part. Such an account 
steers clear of the typical conundrum of metaphysical interpretations: trying to 
square how someone like Dharmakīrti can argue for both external realism and 
some version of epistemic idealism.
Notes
1 For a review of the various positions that Dharmakīrti can be said to endorse, 
see Siderits (1999), Eltschinger (2010), and Tillemans (2014).
2 For a good overview of core aspects of the Abhidharma project, see Williams 
(1981), Cox (1995), and Ronkin (2005).
3 Conceived largely as a project of integrating phenomenological and epistemo-
logical theories into the framework of the natural sciences, this was also the 
first study to bring Buddhist philosophy of mind in conversation with the 
sciences of cognition.
4 This is largely a Quinean conception of naturalism. In his influential analysis of 
the failure of traditional epistemology to answer the problem of the foundation 
of our beliefs, Quine (1969) ended with a proposal that we abandon a priori 
reasoning and devote ourselves instead simply to studying the psychological 
processes by which we form beliefs. Strong defenders of naturalism, such as 
Kornblith (1999) and Stich (1990), have argued against rationality as a founda-
tional principle for traditional epistemology. More moderate versions of natural-
ism, as one finds in Kim (1988) and Goldman (1992), allow for evaluative 
questions about rationality, justification, and knowledge to be pursued in a 
traditional manner.
5 See Coseru (2012, ch. 2).
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6 On this aspect of Dharmakīrti’s thought, see Hayes (1980), Gillon (1991), and 
Tillemans (2014).
7 See, for instance, Hurley (1998), Noë (2004), Gallagher (2006), and Thompson 
(2007).
8 See, for instance, MacKenzie (2009) and Chadha (2011).
9 Ganeri, for instance, suggests additional affinities between Dharmakīrti’s 
account of perception and theories developed in recent years by Andy Clark 
and Christopher Peacocke (Ganeri 2011, 238).
10 I address this issue at length in Coseru (2009).
11 I derive this example of pragmatic reasoning from Bell (2001, 46ff.).
12 It may be worth noting here that arguments for the impermanence of sound 
are framed as Buddhist refutations of the characteristically Mīmāṃsaka proof 
about the infallibility of trustworthy verbal testimony (śabda‐pramāṇa).
13 Translation, slightly altered, per Hayes and Gillon (2008, 340).
14 For now, I leave aside the question whether in framing the kāryānumāna 
argument as he does, Dharmakīrti’s motive is ultimately soteriological. 
For more on this issue, see Steinkellner (1999).
15 For detailed accounts of how the conception of nature can be opened up to 
include consciousness and intentionality, see Smith (1999), who mainly uses 
Gibson’s (1979) ecological approach to perception as a model.
16 See Palmer (1999).
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